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BAD FAITH AT MIDDLE AGE: COMMENTS ON "THE
PRINCIPLE WITHOUT A NAME (YET)," INSURANCE LAW,
CONTRACT LAW, SPECIALNESS, DISTINCTIVENESS, AND
DIFFERENCE
ROBERT H. JERRY, II*
In this article, Robert Jerry expounds on Professor Abraham's
article on insurer liability for bad faith by pointing out that the concept of
institutional bad faith is not a new phenomenon, but rather, one that is as
old as the insurance industry itself Jerry focuses on Abraham's depiction
of the "specialness" and "distinctiveness" of insurance, while exploring
additional instances of "rotten to the core" systemic bad faith dating as far
back as the nineteenth-century. Much like Abraham did in his article on
bad faith, Jerry uses these examples of systemic bad faith to further his
assertion that the insurance industry, due to its "specialness, " is held to
higher standards of care than other realms of "ordinary business."
In "Liability for Bad Faith and The Principle Without a Name
(Yet)," Professor Kenneth Abraham discerns an original and compelling
way to express one of the core insights upon which much of the modern
law of insurance is built: that insurance has special characteristics not
found in the other things, services, information, etc. which individuals and
institutions value and acquire, and that the law governing insurance
transactions is itself special, distinctive, and different.' Through the
decades, this insight has been expressed, if not always entirely accurately,
in a number of different ways: insurance is a special kind of chattel or
* Dean and Levin, Mabie and Levin Professor, Fredric G. Levin College of
Law, University of Florida. This paper is based upon a presentation originally
given at the Rutgers Bad Faith & Beyond Conference: A Conference on the Law of
Claims Practices, in Camden, New Jersey, on February 29, 2012, available at
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/bad-faith-beyond (last visited July 22, 2012). 1 want to
express thanks to Lindsay Cohen, L'l 3, for her research assistance.
' See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle without a
Name (Yet), 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2012).
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quasi-chattel; 2 insurance, as an aleatory contract instead of a commutative
contract, involves an uneven exchange of values that leads to the "peculiar
legal aspects" of the contract;3 the relationship between insurer and insured
is fiduciary, or quasi-fiduciary, in nature;4 an insurance contract is more
than an "ordinary contract" and insurance law is more than "ordinary
contract law";' insurance contracts are imbued with heightened obligations
of good faith and fair dealing;6 in insurance contracts the duty of good faith
is a "one way street," unlike general contracts where the duty runs both
directions;7 and so on.
2 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 34
(3d ed. Jaeger 1963). See Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d
413, 424 n.10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (describing "equally valid" analysis that treats
insurance policy as "in the nature of a special chattel rather than a contract").
Imagining insurance as a chattel leads to the argument that insurance policies
contain an implied warranty of fitness for an intended purpose, but implied
warranty analysis has not gained traction in the insurance cases.
3 EDWIN M. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 62 (2d ed. 1957).
4 See Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 531 (3d Cir.
1997) (insurer's duty of good faith toward insured is predicated on fiduciary
relationship created when the contract is f6rmed); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d
565, 571 (Ariz. 1986) (relationship between insurer and insured is not fiduciary
relationship, but has some elements of a fiduciary relationship). Cf Lyerla v.
AMCO Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Illinois law, no
fiduciary relationship exists between insurers and insureds). For more discussion,
see Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their
Insureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1 (2000).
5 See, e.g., Victor v. Turner, 496 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
("[I]nsurance industry transactions with consumers are not governed by ordinary
contract law."); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw.
U. L. REv. 737, 744 (2000) ("Insurance is a contractual relationship, but courts and
legislatures have developed a body of insurance law that is distinct from the
mainstream of contract."); Dudi Schwartz, Interpretation and Disclosure in
Insurance Contracts, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 105, 113 ("[I]nsurance law's
rules, including interpretive rules, were designed to distinguish the insurance
industry from other fields of contract law.") (citation omitted).
6 See, e.g., Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251-52 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) ("[B]ecause of the 'special relationship' inherent in the unique nature of an
insurance contract, the insurer's obligations attendant to its duty of good faith are
heightened."); Nugent v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 752 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56
(D.D.C. 2010) (insurance contracts have special characteristics that "warrant
heightened liability" for breach of the duty of good faith) (citation omitted).
7 See, e.g., Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W. 2d 203 (Iowa
1995) (Iowa does not recognize tort action for "reverse" bad faith by insurer
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The common theme running through the foregoing expressions
emerges from the unique characteristics of insurance itself. All contracts
involve transfers of risk in some way, typically at the margin of some other
sale or exchange, but what distinguishes insurance contracts is the fact that
they exist for the purpose of transferring risk. Courts have sought to
capture this idea, usually when deciding the boundaries of state regulatory
authority over transactions that have the look and feel of insurance but may
be something else, in the principle that to constitute an insurance contract,
the transfer and distribution of risk must be the "principal object and
purpose" of the contract,8 the very essence of the exchange that gives the
contract its "distinctive character."9 Because the party casting off risk
through an insurance contract has such an extreme amount of reliance on
the presumed enforceability of the contract and puts so much financial and
emotional well-being at stake in the transaction, all in circumstances where
the insurer knows from the beginning of the magnitude and importance of
this investment (indeed, the insurer markets the product through assurances
of security to the insureds), the protections afforded by law to this party
must be safeguarded with utmost rigor. Through the years, these ideas have
presented themselves in insurance law through pro-insured results and
outcomes that would ordinarily not be predicted if the laws of contract, tort,
agency, equity, or remedies were applied in their expected ways.
Working in ground well plowed by others for decades, Professor
Abraham finds a new and creative way to describe insurance law's
"specialness." He invites us to visualize placing insurance law on a
continuum: insurance law puts obligations on insurers that are more
rigorous than what are placed on ordinary contracting parties, but less
rigorous than the principles under which we test the actions of governments
and state actors. The lens that Professor Abraham uses to capture this
insight is systemic or institutional bad faith.
The law of bad faith is the thread in insurance law where insurers
can be held liable in tort for bad faith performance of the contractual duties
they owe insureds; "[t]he tort duty contemplates that insurers must deal
fairly with insureds and conduct their affairs in good faith." 0 As Professor
against insured who brings frivolous bad faith claim against insurer); Douglas R.
Richmond, The Two- Way Street of Insurance Good Faith: Under Construction,
But Not Yet Open, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 95 (1996).
5 See Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
9 See GAF Corp. v. Cnty. School Bd., 629 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1980).
10 ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 156 (5th ed. 2012).
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Abraham explains, systemic, institutional bad faith is the most recent
evolution in this thread. The cases in which the law of bad faith was
routinely applied after the doctrine's emergence and development in the
1970s and 1980s typically involved an individual insured's claim that the
insurer in the specific claims processing sequence in which the insured and
insurer were involved committed breaches in claims handling that caused
damage to the insured, and this damage can be remedied adequately only
under the remedial regime of tort law.
In contrast, the institutional or systemic bad faith claim involves a
situation where an insured takes a dispute over a single loss and challenges
the insurer's practices and procedures as those occurred in claims
processing for all similarly situated claimants, essentially arguing that the
insurer's practices were designed to reduce, or perhaps even eliminate, fair
payments to all claimants." Thus, the notion is that institutional bad faith is
a new kind of bad faith claim that has emerged in the past couple of
decades, and policing these questioned systemic practices under the law of
bad faith represents an expansion of the territory in which bad faith law
operates.12
Although the bad faith cases of recent years in which plaintiffs
allege systemic or institutional insurer bad faith conduct are departures
from the circumstances in which bad faith was alleged in the past, this does
not mean that claims against insurers for institutional, systemic misconduct
are new. Professor Abraham refers to these alleged systemic practices as
ones that are "rotten to the core";13 I would suggest that allegations of
1" See Douglas R. Richmond, Defining and Confining Institutional Bad Faith
in Insurance, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 1 (2010) ("Essentially, the
theory of institutional bad faith allows a plaintiff to expand a dispute over a single
loss into a widespread attack on an insurance company's practices and procedures";
citing MICHAEL R. NELSON ET AL., EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LITIGATION AGAINST
INSURERS § 2.11, at 2-59 (2009)); James A. Vamer, Tiffany R. Drust & Debra T.
Herron, Institutional Bad Faith: The Darth Vader of Extra-Contractual Litigation,
57 FED'N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 163, 163 (2007) ("Institutional bad faith is
the 'Ebola' virus of extra contractual litigation . . . . [I]t can . . . grow explosively
and wreck not only litigation management budgets, but can also seriously deplete
corporate equity and shareholder value.").
12 Richmond observes that "[t]here. is a surprising lack of case law on
institutional bad faith given the frequency with which such allegations are made.
This disparity is probably attributable to the fact that carriers settle many
institutional bad faith cases to avoid discovery costs and potentially severe damage
exposure." Richmond, supra note 11, at 4 n.8.
13 See Abraham, supra note 1, at 12.
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systemic, "rotten to the core" insurer practices have been made for decades,
with the major and important difference between those older allegations
and the more modern ones is that the earlier claims did not have a law of
bad faith in which the allegations could be packaged and presented. If these
practices existed today and were being challenged today, they would be
packaged in the same wrapping in which the modem systemic, institutional
bad faith claims are alleged.
If the amount of litigation and commentary in the literature in the
early twentieth century are reliable guides, one of the prominent early
examples of systemic, institutional bad faith conduct by insurers involved
insurers' delay in action on applications. Like today, insurers took the first
premium payment with the application, but did not issue the policy until a
period of time passed during which the insurer evaluated whether to accept
the risk. During this period the insurer would have use of the insured's
money, but, in the absence of a binder providing temporary coverage, the
applicant had no protection. Even with a temporary written binding receipt,
the coverage was often so conditional that the applicant who suffered a loss
during the period the binder was in force received no compensation. Many
binders by their terms purported to eliminate coverage if the application
would be unacceptable to the insurer's underwriting department. The
frequency of ex poste determinations of ineligibility was itself a matter of
concern for insureds, and the longer the insurer could delay acting on
applications, the less exposure the insurer would have on the risk. Yet if no
loss occurred during the period between application and policy issuance,
the policy's coverage upon issuance would be backdated to the time of the
application, so the insurer engaged in this practice essentially received a
payment for nothing. Delaying action on the application lengthened the
period during which this imbalance existed. Like a number of other insurer
practices that caught the attention of the public, legislators, regulators, and
the Armstrong Commission, this practice was one of those that was "rotten
to the core," and it was one that, apparently, was institutional and systemic.
Courts confronting this practice in the early twentieth century had
considerable trouble regulating insurers' delay in acting on applications
because the legal doctrines of that time were inapplicable.14 Unless a
temporary binder was issued, there was no contract between applicant and
insurer to which contract law principles could be applied; furthermore,
14 For examples of cases declining to hold the insurer liable for delay in acting
on an application, see Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 121 So. 487, 489
(Miss. 1929) (fact that insurer is granted franchise to do business in the state does
not impose upon them a duty to consider promptly all who apply).
17
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there was no basis for finding that the insurer had taken action that would
create a contractual obligation. The applicant made the offer to form the
contract with the application; if the application was not accepted, no
contract was formed. Courts correctly described the insurer's inaction on
the application as "silence," but under the rules of contract law, silence did
not constitute acceptance absent special circumstances," none of which
existed in the typical fact pattern. Construing the insurer's retention of the
premium as a promise to be bound was not a plausible interpretation of the
usual circumstances. Estoppel, as it was understood both then and now
under the label "equitable estoppel," did not fit because there was no false
or misleading statement inducing reliance.16 Promissory estoppel as a basis
for recognizing the existence of a contract was a doctrine in its infancy; yet
the insurer made no promise that might induce detrimental reliance, which
was essential from the beginning of the doctrine's history to finding an
enforceable promise in the absence of offer, acceptance, and a
consideration that was the object of a bargained-for exchange.' 7
As we now know, many courts attempted to regulate the insurer
misbehavior, and these courts, looking for ways to extend the established
doctrines of that era, approved the principle of imposed responsibility
grounded in the recognition of a duty to act.'8 The circularity of this
'5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1981)
("Acceptance by silence is exceptional. Ordinarily offeror does not have power to
cause the silence of the offeree to operate as acceptance.... The exceptional cases
where silence can be acceptance . . . [are] those where the offeree silently takes
offered benefits, and those where one party relies on the other party's
manifestation of intention that silence may operate as acceptance.").
16 The elements of equitable estoppel are generally described as: (1) belief and
reliance on a representation; (2) a change of position because of the representation;
(3) detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position. See, e.g., Cothem v.
Vickers, Inc., 759 So.2d 1241, 1249 (Miss. 2000) (discussing elements in context
of former supervisor's action against employer); Lybbert v. Grant Cnty., 1 P.3d
1124, 1128 (Wash. 2000) (discussing elements of equitable estoppel in context of
county's effort to assert insufficient service of process as affirmative defense).
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (elements of
promissory estoppel are a promise and substantial reliance that is actual and
reasonably foreseeable, in circumstances where enforcing the promise is necessary
in the interests ofjustice).
1 See, e.g., Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 121 P. 329, 331 (Kan.
1912) (hail insurance policy that issued policy day after crop was destroyed by
hailstorm is liable in damages due to unreasonable delay by its soliciting agent in
forwarding the application); Wilken v. Capital Fire Ins. Co. of Lincoln, 157 N.W.
1021, 1022-23 (Neb. 1916) (bank's delay in returning application was act of agent
Vol. 19.1
2012 COMMENT ON "PRINCIPLE WITHOUT A NAME"
reasoning begs the question of exactly where this duty came from. Some
courts found it in the idea that a company doing business under a franchise
assumes a duty toward the public,1 9 but why this would be so is not
obvious. Presumably the intended logic underlying this conclusion is that
the protection afforded the franchise through its enforcement by the state
created a reciprocal obligation - essentially, a quid pro quo - on the part of
the franchise holder to serve the state, i.e., the public, with prompt action
on the public's requests, applications, etc. Failure to do so breached the
duty, and damages caused by the breach could be remedied in tort.
This reasoning sounded plausible and authoritative, and, expressed
as a rationale for a decision, seemed to have its anchor in other more
familiar legal principles with which we are comfortable. But as frequently
illustrated during the centuries in which the common law has evolved, new
reasoning when applied to other similar situations can cause extreme
havoc. For example, if the existence of the insurance franchise is what
establishes the duty, the duty to act must presumably exist in the business
activities of other kinds of corporations and business organizations
operating under franchises. An obvious example is a bank; thus, does it
follow that a bank which receives an application for a loan and delays
acting upon it breaches the duty to act and thereby commits a tort?20
Of course, if we sense that this goes too far and that a bank should
not be liable for delay in acting on an application for a loan, we are
challenged to explain why a franchise to engage in the insurance business
imposes a more robust duty to act without delay. Taking up the challenge,
we would argue that "ordinary business" is not the same as the insurance
business. Banks and other lenders acting on applications for loans are
engaged in "ordinary business," like those who sell products, services,
licenses, information, and so forth. These products, services, etc. are not the
of insurer, and insurer is responsible for damage caused by delay in acting on
application); Behnke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 41 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1930)
(under Wisconsin law, insurance company may be liable for delay in passing upon
application).
19 See Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 139 N.W. 1087, 1090 (Iowa 1913)
(insurance company "holds and is acting under a franchise from the state").
20 See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir.
1993) (affirming district court's finding that "the Bank had no fiduciary duty to
accept or respond promptly"); Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817
So. 2d 665, 681 (Ala. 2001) ("'There is . .. no tort liability for nonfeasance for
failing to do what one has promised to do in the absence of a duty to act apart from
the promise made."' (quoting Morgan v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107,
114 (Ala. 1985))).
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same as insurance -- which is special, distinctive, and different. Because
insurance is special, the duties that attach to the corporation or business
organization engaging in the insurance business are greater. If the principle
we use to justify finding a duty to act would also make those engaged in
"ordinary business" liable, then we must be applying the wrong principle to
the problem arising in the "ordinary business." Insurance is special; it is
distinctive; it is different. The insurance business is imbued with the public
interest in a way that "ordinary business," such as the business of banks
making loans) is not.
Interestingly, the framework just described is exactly where the
law is landing in the early twenty-first century. On the issue of whether
lenders ought to have liability in tort for negligent delay in processing an
application for a loan, it is easy to see that an applicant for a loan could be
harmed with the loss of favorable financing terms due to the passage of
time during which the lender delays. Yet the consensus, at least thus far,
from cases that date back to shortly after the explosion in insurance bad
faith litigation, is that recognizing tort liability for lenders in the financial
industries is problematic, and, except for rare exceptions that have not
garnered a strong following, 21 courts have not embraced the idea.2 2 It
appears that the insurance business is special, but the lending business is
not, and the more rigorous analysis applied to insurance industry practices
by insurance law is not something that is or will be applied in similar
fashion in the lending industry.
Thus, perhaps the decisive reason for recognizing an insurer's tort
duty to act promptly on an application for insurance is not the existence of
the franchise but is instead the existence of a relationship imbued with the
public interest. To what other analogous situations might this principle
apply? Consider markets for employment: it is certainly in the public
interest that those who are able to work have jobs that enable them to earn
salaries or wages sufficient to support themselves and their dependents. But
are we willing to use public interest analysis to create a rule that employers,
many of whom obviously do not operate under franchises, are obligated to
act promptly on applications for employment? The answer is, apparently,
no. So here, as with lending, we conclude that employment,
notwithstanding its obvious importance, is "ordinary business" -- or it is
21 See Jacques v. First Nat. Bank of Md., 515 A.2d 756, 762 (1986) (bank that
agrees to process application for loan owes customer duty of reasonable care in
processing and determination of the application).
22 See Nan S. Ellis & John A. Gray, Lender Liability for Negligently
Processing Loan Applications, 92 DICK. L. REV. 363, 366-68 (1988).
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not "business" at all under some kind of conclusory rule that "employment
is labor, and business is business." As we keep delay in acting upon
applications for employment out of the realm where courts will provide a
remedy, we embrace the idea that insurance is somehow special,
distinctive, different, and in need of a different legal framework than what
applies to other "ordinary" business practices in other markets,
notwithstanding the obvious importance of the transactions that occur in
those other markets.
The foregoing, of course, is exactly Professor Abraham's point.
Upon a close look, the decades-old recognition of the insurer's tort duty to
act promptly on applications comes from the legal system's negative
reaction to institutional, systemic, rotten-to-the-core bad faith practices that
compromise the value of seeking and securing insurance protection. In
other words, insurers have a responsibility to act promptly on applications;
this obligation is embedded in the nature of the insurance business, where
security from the risks of loss is the subject of the bargain; damage is
foreseeable in the absence of the insurer's reasonably diligent action on the
application; negligent retention of the application without prompt action
sounds like a tort; and courts are comfortable finding a tort-based duty to
act promptly on an insurance application, with damages flowing from the
breach of this duty. If the delay in acting on the application cases had arisen
in the late twentieth and early twentieth-first century, they surely would
have been pleaded as bad faith cases, consistently with the other examples
referenced by Professor Abraham and other commentators. Reduced to its
essence, the practice of insurer delay in responding to applications appears
to have been a systemic, institutional practice sharing the "rotten to the
core" characteristics of the practices that have produced the bad faith
claims processing litigation of recent years. The law's response to the older
practices reveals the specialness and distinctiveness of insurance as
profoundly as the modern responses continue to demonstrate.
In addition to the duty to act on applications, there are other
examples in the past of what we would today label institutional, systemic
bad faith. Of the four modem examples of institutional, systemic bad faith
discussed by Professor Abraham, the one involving contingent
commissions does not involve bad faith claims processing. How much is
wrong with contingent commission arrangements and the manner in which
such secret commission deals should be regulated are unresolved questions
today; the regulatory options range from disclosure of the arrangements on
21
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the one hand to outright prohibition on the other.23 This controversy is
reminiscent of a past widespread industry practice - premium and
commission rebating -- where the question was whether to regulate and, if
so, how. Early in the twentieth century, the question of whether premium
and commission rebating was valid was settled in the legislative arenas
with the answer "no."24 This history is revealing on the subject of insurance
law's specialness, distinctiveness, and difference.
The anti-rebate statutes have their roots in the rapid expansion of
the life insurance industry in the late nineteenth century, and it is fair to
characterize that period of expansion as endemic with high pressure sales
tactics, deceptive trade practices, and very high agent commissions. 25 I
this wild-west market, agents created a variety of ways to refund portions
of their commissions to customers, and rebating gradually became
perceived as an evil that led to inequality and discrimination among
applicants, with the privileged getting good deals unavailable to the general
public. Rebating came to be considered a threat to the integrity of the
insurance business, and insurance regulators acting in the public interest
sought to prohibit it. That rebating of commissions in the insurance setting
is an untoward business practice remains the prevailing view today.
Yet, interestingly enough, rebates of commissions, payments, or
other consideration through renegotiated business arrangements are met
with less hostility when they occur outside the insurance business. In real
estate transactions, for example, it is common for a person represented by a
broker during negotiations with a prospective buyer over price to
simultaneously renegotiate the commission to be paid her agent in the
transaction. Similarly, cash-back rebates when a consumer buys a product
and meets certain eligibility conditions are not seriously questioned as
unfair price discrimination, and cash-back rebates for making purchases
with a credit card are virtually the norm. By analogy to these practices, one
can legitimately wonder what would be wrong with negotiating an
23 See generally, Hazel Beh & Amanda M. Willis, Insurance Intermediaries,
15 CONN. INS. L.J. 571, 591-94 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The
Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 289, 321-23
(2007).
24 For discussion of the history of this practice, see Robert H. Jerry, II &
Reginald Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the Negotiation of Insurance Agent
Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review Under State Constitutions, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 776-80 (1990).
25 See Constitutionality of Ins. Anti-Rebate Law, 1996 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen.
(Apr. 22).
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individualized commission with an insurance agent based on the value of
the agent's services and the prospective insured's interest in using them.
Yet as a matter of statutory law, the insurance agent is required to
decline summarily any such request for a refund of a portion of the
commission on the grounds that doing so would be illegal.26 Whether this
regulatory framework is wise is a question for another day (and if
contingent commissions are declared illegal, the wisdom of that prohibition
will also continue to be debated). The fact remains, however, that a practice
tolerated in other contexts is prohibited in insurance, reminding us that
insurance is special, distinctive, and different. What we tolerate in other
business settings with regard to commission splitting, rebating, etc. is not
tolerated in insurance under the reasoning that this would create
impermissible inequities among classes of purchasers and might even
threaten the solvency of insurers if premium rebates became too common.
This has the effect of treating insurance as a quasi-public good; just as
similarly situated consumers should pay the same rates for water,
electricity, or fire protection, similarly situated consumers should not be
able to strike back-room deals that change the price paid for the same
product, and insurers should not be able to engage in systemic, institutional
practices that advantage a privileged few at the expense of the many. This,
again, is precisely the point made by Professor Abraham:
[T]the bad faith behavior in each instance is
something that we probably would tolerate, and
have the law tolerate, if it-were a different sort of
business enterprise that engaged in this behavior.
... If an auto parts retailer had a secret deal
with some manufacturers that it would be paid an
26 See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So. 2d 1210, 1221 (Fla. 2000)
(declaring anti-rebate statutes unconstitutional "to the extent they prohibit title
insurance agents from rebating a portion of their risk premium"); Dep't of Ins. v.
Dade Cnty. Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1986)
(holding the Florida statute unconstitutional "to the extent they prohibit rebates of
insurance agents' commissions"). The California rebate law was repealed by
Proposition 103 in 1988. See, The McCarran-Ferguson Act Before the Antitrust
Modernization Comm'n (Oct. 18, 2006) (statement of Jay Angoff, Of Counsel,
Roger Brown & Associates), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission hearings/pdflStatementAngoff.pd
f (last visited July 22, 2012). Despite the invalidity of the statutes in those two
states, there are no readily available indications that consumers are seeking to
negotiate rebates or commission returns with agents, brokers, or insurers.
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annual rebate that increased ifproducts liability
suits against the manufacturer decreased, we
would consider this no business of those who
purchased the auto parts in question, even if this
affected which customers were influenced to buy
which kinds of parts. These would be examples
of harsh, slightly unsavory dealing, but that's
about it.2 7
This point is correct not only with respect to the examples discussed by
Professor Abraham but also with respect, in the insurance setting, to the act
of rebating itself.
Another example of institutional, systemic bad faith from the past
is found in claims processing regulations created in the early twentieth
century. Insurers' use of the defense of misrepresentation has a long and
interesting history, but the portion of the narrative relevant here involves
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century practice where life insurers
frequently alleged misrepresentation by the applicant when a claim for
proceeds was filed many years after the policy had been issued. In these
circumstances, the beneficiaries had great difficulty refuting, and would
perhaps be unable to refute, the insurer's assertion of the defense. Aware
of the mismatch between beneficiaries and the insurer in this setting, many
insurers took advantage and pressed the disparity to their financial
advantage, or at least so the common wisdom ran. This systemic,
institutional, "rotten-to-the-core" practice led to the widespread enactment
of incontestability statutes early in the twentieth century. If a similar kind
of regulation exists in another contracting context, it is obscure. Once
again, this systemic, institutional insurer practice, and the regulatory
response to it, illustrates that insurance has a special, distinctive status
among the relationships, products, and services that consumers purchase
and acquire. Not surprisingly, the law governing insurance recognizes this
specialness and assumes the characteristics and dimensions of a body of
law operating in its own field with its own principles and rules.
I like the statement "[1]ife is uncertain, 28 because it expresses in
three words the basic truth upon which all of the business and law of
insurance, not to mention most human behavior, is based. I also like
Professor Leonard Moldinow's observation that "our clear visions of
27 See Abraham, supra note 1, at 13.
28 Robert H. Jerry, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 9 (1st ed. 1987).
Vol. 19.1
2012 COMMENT ON "PRINCIPLE WITHOUT A NAME"
inevitability are often only illusions."29 Blending these two insights yields a
third: In life and in law, one can always look back and say "there are many
different ways this could have unfolded." Just as the core insight that
insurance law is special, distinct, and different can be articulated in
different ways,3 0 the path through which this core insight is manifested in
the law could have evolved differently than it did, and there are multiple
paths that its future evolution might take. Looking backwards, we might
observe that the core insight has been in the middle of some jurisprudential
currents that flowed parallel to those of insurance law during most of the
twentieth century. A notable example is the analysis of Friedrich Kessler
presented in his 1943 article in the Columbia Law Review on standardized
forms, 31 arguably the most prominent of the early explorations of the
challenges standardization poses to the principles of contract law. Kessler
used insurance policies as his principal example, discussed the problem of
insurers' delay in acting on applications, and presented what was probably
the first articulation of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.32 Early in
the article, Kessler explained how courts had succeeded in reaching just
decisions in construing ambiguous claims against the policies' drafters -
even in cases where there was no ambiguity. He then observed that these
techniques, however, were unable to address a problem arising in contract
formation - delay in acting on an application. He observed that courts
29 LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD'S WALK: How RANDOMNESS
RULES OUR LIvES 218 (2008).
30 See supra pp. 1-2.
31 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
32 Kessler plainly recognized "reasonable expectations" permeates "our whole
law of contacts," and embraced the notion that contract terms should be rewritten
to fulfill reasonable expectations. Id. at 629, 637. However, credit for recognizing
the doctrine of reasonable expectations is given to Professor Robert Keeton, who
while a professor at Harvard Law School wrote a seminal article titled Insurance
Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 967 (1970).
Professor Keeton's thesis was that many courts had applied familiar rules to the
end of not enforcing clear contract language based on one of the parties'
"reasonable expectations" of coverage. Id. This two-part article is a remarkable
work that brought together a large number of related principles, all of which serve
to demonstrate why insurance and the law governing it are special. Kessler,
however, put squarely on the table the notion that with standardized contracts, "[i]t
can hardly be objected that the resulting task of rewriting, if necessary, the contents
of a contract of adhesion is foreign to the function of common law courts."
Kessler, supra note 31, at 637 (emphasis added).
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seeking to solve this problem had invoked a tort law duty to act promptly
on an application as the solution.
Kessler's broader point was essentially to advocate, like some
other scholars of that era, that contract law be divided into dual
frameworks: one for negotiated contracts between parties with roughly
equal information and bargaining power, and one for contracts created
through the use of standardized forms. He wrote:
[Here is the] basic issue with which the courts in the
insurance cases are confronted. It is: can the unity of the
law of contracts be maintained in the face of the increasing
use of contracts of adhesion? The few courts which allow
recovery in contract and the many which allow recovery in
tort feel more or less clearly that insurance contracts are
contracts of adhesion, and try to protect the weaker
contracting party against the harshness of the common law
and against what they think are abuses of freedom of
contract. The courts denying recovery, on the other hand,
cling to the belief that an application for insurance is not
different from any other offer, and they are convinced that
efforts to build up by trial and error a dual system of
contract law must inevitably undermine the security
function of all law, particularly since courts are ill
equipped to decide whether and to what extent an
insurance contract has compulsory features.
Kessler favored a dual system where standardized contracts received
heightened regulation. Importantly, a major reason he came to that
conclusion was because he understood that insurance involved a different
kind of contract, where the subject of exchange was more important than
the ordinary commodities exchanged in other contracts. To preserve and
promote this value, he proposed that the law of torts be used to "nullify
those parts of the law of contracts which in the public interest are regarded
as inapplicable."34
Professor Abraham's continuum, where insurance law rests in the
middle between ordinary contract law on the one hand and government
regulation on the other, is entirely consistent with Professor Kessler's
observation that contract law's unity was not sustainable, and that
33 Kessler, supra note 31, at 636 (emphasis added).
34 d.
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standardized contracts (e.g., insurance contracts) needed a different system
of governance than ordinary contracts freely negotiated between parties of
roughly equivalent bargaining power. Kessler's embrace of tort principles
to deal with the problem of an insurer's delay in acting on applications was
essentially the equivalent of putting the tort-driven new principles of the
"new contract law" in the center of the continuum.
Later in the twentieth century, Professor Robert Keeton addressed
the question of the insurers' delay in acting on an application in his 1971
Basic Text on Insurance.'' He began with an overview of the limitations of
existing estoppel, contract, and tort doctrines to address the harm caused by
insurers' delay.36 Having catalogued various reasons these doctrines were
inadequate to address the issue, he advanced arguments for "a somewhat
broader liability than that imposed in tort. "3 His initial argument was
essentially an economic efficiency rationale without the dressing of the
vocabulary of law and economics; he essentially suggested that insurers
could spread the risk of delay's harm across premium-paying insured more
efficiently.38 His second argument came back to the fundamental premise
that insurance law is different, distinctive, and special. Invoking and citing
Kessler, he observed that insurance transactions almost always involve "the
standardized mass contract" and "courts should develop a different set of
doctrines for such cases, rather than allowing technical doctrines of
contract law to defeat liability when public interest would be served by
imposing it."39 Moreover, just as "railroad companies have been required
to furnish transportation to all qualified passengers and shippers, . . . an
insurance company might similarly be regarded as a public service
company, under a legal duty to insure upon reasonable terms all properly
qualified applicants."40 Keeton wrote that the case law as of 1971 had not
yet reached the 'insurance as public service company' principle, but he
believed a 'different kind of contract law' was already being applied, even
if courts "seldom expressed [it] in this way."4 1
Bad faith has now reached middle age. With the helpful insights of
Professor Abraham, we can now see in bad faith's evolution additional
evidence that insurance law is special, distinctive, and different, and we
35 ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW (1971).36 Id. at 45-48.
37 Id. at 48.38 Id. at 48-49.
3 1 d. at 49.40 d.
41Id. at 50.
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have another way to express it. As a result, "our understanding of what
insurance law is, and what insurance does" is, in fact, now deeper.42
42 See Abraham, supra note 1, at 13.
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